The ability to work well in a team is becoming increasingly important across disciplines and throughout the workplace, making it a valuable skill for students to develop. Evidence suggests that diverse perspectives can generate more innovative ideas and enhance critical thinking, but only if team members value diversity and share knowledge with one another. To foster students{\textquoteright} abilities to work well in diverse teams, we must teach them why collaboration is important and how to bring about its benefits. We describe a new interdisciplinary course designed with these goals, along with an evaluation of the degree to which students who take this course show changes in attitudes and beliefs around teamwork. The course emphasizes psychological safety{\textemdash}a measure of how safe a team is for interpersonal risk-taking. Research shows that psychological safety is an important predictor of team success and a key mechanism for incorporating diverse perspectives. We surveyed students at the start of the course, the end of the course, and just after the following term. At the end of the course, students reported increased psychological safety in their teams, more positive attitudes towards teamwork, and stronger beliefs that diversity is beneficial. At the end of the following term, students reported higher levels of psychological safety in their teams than before the course, and their attitudes about psychological safety and teamwork still remained more positive. We discuss implications of these findings for researchers studying student teamwork and for instructors who wish to introduce or improve collaborative experiences in their courses.
}, author = {Kathryn S. Plaisance and Christine Logel and Christopher Lok} } @article {25101, title = {A Framework for Analyzing Broadly Engaged Philosophy of Science}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2021}, month = {2020}, abstract = {Philosophers of science are increasingly interested in engaging with scientific communities, policymakers, and members of the public; however, the nature of this engagement has not been systematically examined. Instead of delineating a specific kind of engaged philosophy of science, as previous accounts have done, this paper draws on literature from outside the discipline to develop a framework for analyzing different forms of broadly engaged philosophy of science according to two key dimensions: social interaction and epistemic integration. Clarifying the many forms of engagement available to philosophers of science can advance future scholarship on engagement and promote more strategic engagement efforts.
}, author = {Kathryn S. Plaisance and Kevin C. Elliott} } @article {27172, title = {Pathways of influence: understanding the impact of philosophy of science in scientific domains}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2021}, abstract = {Philosophy of science has the potential to improve scientific practice, science policy, and science education; moreover, recent research indicates that many philosophers of science think we ought to increase the broader impacts of our work. Yet, there is little to no empirical data on how we are supposed to have an impact. To address this problem, our research team interviewed 35 philosophers of science regarding the impact of their work in science-related domains. We found that face-to-face engagement with scientists and other stakeholders was one of the most {\textendash} if not the most {\textendash} effective pathways to impact. Yet, working with non-philosophers and disseminating research outside philosophical venues is not what philosophers are typically trained or incentivized to do. Thus, there is a troublesome tension between the activities that are likely to lead to broader uptake of one{\textquoteright}s work and those that are traditionally encouraged and rewarded in philosophy (and which are therefore the most consequential for careers in philosophy). We suggest several ways that philosophers of science, either as individuals or as a community, can navigate these tensions.
}, author = {Kathryn S. Plaisance and Jay Michaud and John McLevey} } @article {24286, title = {The Benefits of Acquiring Interactional Expertise: Why (Some) Philosophers of Science Should Engage Scientific Communities}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {83}, year = {2020}, pages = {53-62}, abstract = {Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for and addressing the need to do work that is socially and scientifically engaged. However, we currently lack well-developed frameworks for thinking about how we should engage other expert communities and what the epistemic benefits are of doing so. In this paper, I draw on Collins and Evans{\textquoteright} concept of {\textquoteleft}interactional expertise{\textquoteright} {\textendash} the ability to speak the language of a discipline in the absence of an ability to practice {\textendash} to consider the epistemic benefits that can arise when philosophers engage scientific communities. As Collins and Evans argue, becoming an interactional expert requires that one {\textquoteleft}hang out{\textquoteright} with members of the relevant expert community in order to learn crucial tacit knowledge needed to speak the language. Building on this work, I argue that acquiring interactional expertise not only leads to linguistic fluency, but it also confers several {\textquoteleft}socio-epistemic{\textquoteright} benefits such as the opportunity to cultivate trust with scientific communities. These benefits can improve philosophical work\ and\ facilitate the broader uptake of philosophers{\textquoteright} ideas, enabling philosophers to meet a variety of epistemic goals. As a result, having at least some philosophers of science acquire interactional expertise via engagement will likely enhance the diversity of epistemic capacities for philosophy of science as a whole. For some philosophers of science, moreover, the socio-epistemic benefits identified here may be\ more\ important than the ability to speak the language of a discipline, suggesting the need for a broader analysis of interactional expertise, which this paper also advances.}, author = {Kathryn S. Plaisance} } @article {28535, title = {Can a brief intervention alter genetic and environmental influences on psychological traits? An experimental behavioral genetics approach}, journal = {Learning and Motivation}, volume = {72}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Mindset interventions are designed to encourage students to adopt a\ growth mindset, reflecting the belief that one{\textquoteright}s intelligence can be improved in an effort to increase academic achievement. How do these interventions exert their effects? We assessed the effects of an online mindset intervention on mindset and four outcome variables, grit, locus of control, challenge-seeking behavior, and cognitive ability test performance in a sample of 1668 twins in 840 families. The mindset intervention successfully induced a growth mindset, but had no effect on the outcome variables. Biometric modeling of self-reported mindset before and after the intervention further revealed that this mean change in mindset was accompanied by changes in its etiology. At baseline, nonshared environmental contributions to individual differences in mindset predominated, while additive genetic contributions were small-to-moderate and shared environmental contributions were negligible. After the intervention, there was an increase in additive genetic contributions to individual differences in mindset. In other words, despite its very brief nature, our simple environmental intervention acted to increase the heritability of mindset. Such findings suggest that interventions may sometimes exert their effects by altering the genetic influences on a trait.}, author = {Alexander P Burgoyne and Sarah Carroll and D Angus Clark and David Z Hambrick and Kathryn S Plaisance and Kelly L Klump and S Alexandra Burt} } @article {25102, title = {Show me the numbers: a quantitative portrait of the attitudes, experiences, and values of philosophers of science regarding broadly engaged work}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2019}, note = {Accepted manuscript freely available here:\ }, abstract = {Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for the importance of doing scientifically- and socially-engaged work, suggesting that we need to reduce barriers to extra-disciplinary engagement and broaden our impact. Yet, we currently lack empirical data to inform these discussions, leaving a number of important questions unanswered. How common is it for philosophers of science to engage other communities, and in what ways are they engaging? What barriers are most prevalent when it comes to broadly disseminating one{\textquoteright}s work or collaborating with others? To what extent do philosophers of science actually value an engaged approach? Our project addresses this gap in our collective knowledge by providing empirical data regarding the state of philosophy of science today. We report the results of a survey of 299 philosophers of science about their attitudes towards and experiences with engaging\ those outside the discipline. Our data suggest that a significant majority of philosophers of science think it is important for non-philosophers to read and make use of their work; most are engaging with communities outside the discipline; and many think philosophy of science, as a discipline, has an\ obligation\ to ensure it has a broader impact. Interestingly, however, many of these same philosophers believe engaged work is generally undervalued in the discipline. We think these findings call for cautious optimism on the part of those who value engaged work{\textemdash}while there seems to be more interest in engaging other communities than many assume, significant barriers still remain.}, author = {Kathryn S. Plaisance and Alexander V. Graham and John McLevey and Jay Michaud} } @article {18173, title = {Understanding What Could Be: A Call for \&$\#$39;Experimental Behavioral Genetics\&$\#$39;}, journal = {Behavior Genetics}, volume = {49}, year = {2019}, pages = {235-243}, abstract = {Behavioral genetic (BG) research has yielded many important discoveries about the origins of human behavior, but offers little insight into how we might improve outcomes. We posit that this gap in our knowledge base stems in part from the epidemiologic nature of BG research questions. Namely, BG studies focus on understanding etiology as it currently exists, rather than etiology in environments that could exist but do not as of yet (e.g., etiology following an intervention). Put another way, they focus exclusively on the etiology of {\textquotedblleft}what is{\textquotedblright} rather than {\textquotedblleft}what could be{\textquotedblright}. The current paper discusses various aspects of this field-wide methodological reality, and offers a way to overcome it by demonstrating how behavioral geneticists can incorporate an experimental approach into their work. We outline an ongoing study that embeds a randomized intervention within a twin design, connecting {\textquotedblleft}what is{\textquotedblright} and {\textquotedblleft}what could be{\textquotedblright} for the first time. We then lay out a more general framework for a new field{\textemdash}experimental BGs{\textemdash}which has the potential to advance both scientific inquiry and related philosophical discussions.}, author = {Alexandra Burt and Kathryn S. Plaisance and David Z. Hambrick} } @article {12951, title = {Interdisciplinarity and Insularity in the Diffusion of Knowledge: An Analysis of Disciplinary Boundaries Between Philosophy of Science and the Sciences}, journal = {Scientometrics}, volume = {117}, year = {2018}, pages = {331-349}, abstract = {Two fundamentally different perspectives on knowledge diffusion dominate debates about academic disciplines. On the one hand, critics of disciplinary research and education have argued that disciplines are isolated silos, within which specialists pursue inward-looking and increasingly narrow research agendas. On the other hand, critics of the silo argument have demonstrated that researchers constantly import and export ideas across disciplinary boundaries. These perspectives have different implications for how knowledge diffuses, how intellectuals gain and lose status within their disciplines, and how intellectual reputations evolve within and across disciplines. We argue that highly general claims about the nature of disciplinary boundaries are counterproductive, and that research on the nature of\ specificdisciplinary boundaries is more useful. To that end, this paper uses a novel publication and citation network dataset and statistical models of citation networks to test hypotheses about the boundaries between philosophy of science and 11 disciplinary clusters. Specifically, we test hypotheses about whether engaging with and being cited by scientific communities outside philosophy of science has an impact on one{\textquoteright}s position within philosophy of science. Our results suggest that philosophers of science produce interdisciplinary scholarship, but they tend not to cite work by other philosophers when it is published in journals outside of their discipline. Furthermore, net of other factors, receiving citations from other disciplines has no meaningful impact{\textemdash}positive or negative{\textemdash}on citations within philosophy of science. We conclude by considering this evidence for simultaneous interdisciplinarity and insularity in terms of scientific trading theory and other work on disciplinary boundaries and communication.}, author = {John McLevey and Alexander V. Graham and Reid McIlroy-Young and Pierson Brown and Kathryn S. Plaisance} } @article {8801, title = {A Pluralistic Approach to Interactional Expertise}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {47}, year = {2014}, note = {For a PDF of this paper see,\ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264535717_A_Pluralistic_Approach_to_Interactional_Expertise}, pages = {60-68}, abstract = {The concept of interactional expertise {\textendash} characterized by sociologists Harry Collins and Robert Evans as the ability to speak the language of a discipline without the corresponding ability to practice {\textendash} can serve as a powerful way of breaking down expert/non-expert dichotomies and providing a role for new voices in specialist communities. However, in spite of the vast uptake of this concept and its potential to fruitfully address many important issues related to scientific expertise, there has been surprisingly little critical analysis of it. We seek to remedy this situation by considering potential benefits of interactional expertise and the ways in which the current conception can {\textendash} and cannot {\textendash} realize those benefits. In particular, we argue that interactional expertise hasn{\textquoteright}t reached its full potential for addressing who ought to be involved in scientific research and decision-making, largely owing to an unnecessarily restrictive way of operationalizing the concept. In its place, we offer a broader, more pluralistic account of interactional expertise {\textendash} one that is in line with the original spirit of the concept, but also captures the diversity that we see as being an important aspect of interactional experts and the value they can bring to the table.
}, author = {Kathryn S. Plaisance and Eric B. Kennedy} } @inbook {8805, title = {Chapter 1: The Philosophy of Behavioral Biology}, booktitle = {Philosophy of Behavioral Biology}, volume = {282}, year = {2012}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, edition = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, author = {Kathryn S. Plaisance and Thomas A.C. Reydon} } @book {8804, title = {Philosophy of Behavioral Biology}, year = {2012}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, edition = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 282}, abstract = {This volume offers a broad overview of central issues in the philosophy of behavioral biology, addressing philosophical issues that arise from the most recent scientific findings in biological research on behavior. It thus exemplifies an approach to philosophy of science that is scientifically informed as well as interdisciplinary. Accordingly, it includes chapters by professional philosophers and philosophers of science, as well as practicing scientists.}, editor = {Kathryn S. Plaisance and Thomas A.C. Reydon} } @article {8802, title = {Why the (gene) counting argument fails in the massive modularity debate: The need for understanding gene concepts and genotype-phenotype relationships}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {25}, year = {2012}, pages = {873-892}, abstract = {A number of debates in philosophy of biology and psychology, as well as in their respective sciences, hinge on particular views about the relationship between genotypes and phenotypes. One such view is that the genotype-phenotype relationship is relatively straightforward, in the sense that a genome contains the {\textquotedblleft}genes for{\textquotedblright} the various traits that an organism exhibits. This leads to the assumption that if a particular set of traits is posited to be present in an organism, there must be a corresponding number of genes in that organism{\textquoteright}s genome to account for those traits. This assumption underlies what can be called the {\textquotedblleft}counting argument,{\textquotedblright} in which empirical estimates of the number of genes in a genome are used to support or refute particular hypotheses in philosophical debates about biology and psychology. In this paper, we assess the counting argument as it is used in discussions of the alleged massive modularity of the brain, and conclude that this argument cannot be upheld in light of recent philosophical work on gene concepts and empirical work on genome complexity. In doing so, we illustrate that there are those on both sides of the debate about massive modularity who rely on an incorrect view of gene concepts and the nature of the genotype-phenotype relationship.
}, author = {Kathryn S. Plaisance and Thomas A.C. Reydon and Mehmet Elgin} } @article {12950, title = {Making Philosophy of Science More Socially Relevant [Special Issue]}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {177}, year = {2010}, pages = {301-492}, editor = {Kathryn S. Plaisance and Carla Fehr} } @article {8803, title = {Socially relevant philosophy of science: an introduction}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {177}, year = {2010}, pages = {301-316}, abstract = {This paper is an argument for a more socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPOS).\ Our aims in this paper are to characterize this body of work in philosophy of science (POS), to argue for its importance, and to demonstrate that there are significant opportunities for POS to engage with and support this type of research.\ The impetus of this project was a keen sense of missed opportunities for POS to have a broader social impact. \ We illustrate various ways in which POS can provide social benefits, as well as benefits to scientific practice and philosophy itself.\ Also, SRPOS is consistent with some historical and contemporary goals of POS.\ We{\textquoteright}re calling for an expansion of POS to include more of this type of work.\ In order to support this expansion, we characterize POS as an epistemic community and examine the culture and practices of POS that can help or hinder research in this area.
}, author = {Carla Fehr and Kathryn S. Plaisance} }