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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20230717T143000
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URL:/combinatorics-and-optimization/events/ura-seminar-
 rian-neogi
SUMMARY:URA Seminar - Rian Neogi
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:Summary \n\nTITLE: Budget Feasible Mechanisms\n\nSPEAKER:\n Ria
 n Neogi\n\nAFFILIATION:\n University of À¶Ý®ÊÓƵ\n\nLOCATION:\n MC 5479\n\
 nABSTRACT: In the setting of budget feasible mechanism design\, a buyer\nw
 ants to purchase items from a set of agents. Each agent can supply at\nite
 m at an incurred cost of c_i to themself\, and the buyer wants to\noptimiz
 e over their own valuation for the set of items bought. The\ncost c_i is p
 rivate information that the buyer doesn't have access to.\nThe goal is to 
 design a mechanism that is truthful\, in the sense that\nthe sellers do no
 t have incentive to deviate from reporting their true\ncosts\, and budget 
 feasible\, in the sense that the total payments made\nto the sellers is wi
 thin some budget B.\n 
DTSTAMP:20250516T220112Z
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